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INTRODUCTION
The application of the clean hands doctrine to diplomatic
protection is the subject of considerable debate in the international
legal community, particularly at the U.N. International Law
Commission' ("ILC").2 A suggestion was made at the ILC to include
1. See U.N. Int'l L. Comm'n, Introduction (providing information on the ILC,including its structure and objectives), at http://www.un.org/law/iic/introfra.htm
(last visited Jan. 29, 2005). The ILC is an influential and respectable U.N. body
charged with the codification and progressive development of international law. Id.The U.N. General Assembly established the ILC in 1947, and it is composed of
thirty-four independent experts, each elected for a term of five years by the
General Assembly. Id. The ILC was heavily involved in the elaboration of several
milestone international legal documents, such as the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, and
conventions on the Law of the Sea. Id.
2. See Provisional Summary Record of the 2793rd Meeting, U.N. Int'l L.
Comm'n, 56th Sess., at 3-27, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SR.2793 (May 14, 2004)[hereinafter ILC Meeting 2793] (noting arguments of the members of the
International Law Commission regarding the application of the clean hands
doctrine to the field of diplomatic protection); Provisional Summary Record of the
2792nd Meeting, U.N. Int'l L. Comm'n, 56th Sess., at 17-18, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SR.2792 (May 28, 2004) (same); Provisional Summary Record of the
2819th Meeting, U.N. Int'l L. Comm'n, 56th Sess., at 10-13, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SR.2819 (27 July 2004) [hereinafter ILC Meeting 2819] (same);
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the clean hands doctrine in the ILC's Draft Articles on Diplomatic
Protection as a condition for admissibility of diplomatic protection.
3
This would mean that if an internationally wrongful act of a State
that caused an injury to an alien resulted from this alien's initial
wrongful conduct, the State of the alien's nationality should be
precluded from exercising diplomatic protection over this person.
The strongest supporter of this position at the ILC is Alain Pellet,
who states that diplomatic protection is in fact the only field in which
the clean hands doctrine comes into play.4 John Dugard, Special
Rapporteur on diplomatic protection, rejects this position, insisting
on the inapplicability of the clean hands doctrine to diplomatic
protection.5
This article discusses both the theoretical nature and the practical
implications of applying the clean hands doctrine to diplomatic
protection. Theoretically, this article analyzes the legal nature of the
clean hands doctrine and examines whether or not the clean hands
doctrine is part of diplomatic protection, and if so, whether the clean
hands doctrine should be viewed as a prerequisite for the exercise of
diplomatic protection.6 On a practical level, this article discusses the
appropriateness of including references to the clean hands doctrine as
Provisional Summary Record of the 2791st Meeting, U.N. Int'l L. Comm'n, 56th
Sess., at 9-11, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SR.2791 (May 7, 2004) [hereinafter ILC Meeting
2791] (same).
3. See generally Diplomatic Protection: Titles and Texts of the Draft Articles
Adopted by the Drafting Committee on First Reading, U.N. Int'l L. Comm'n, 56th
Sess., U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.647 (2004) [hereinafter Diplomatic Protection]
(providing those draft articles already adopted by the drafting committee). Thus far
no draft language on inclusion of the clean hands doctrine into the draft article has
been proposed at the ILC.
4. See ILC Meeting 2793, supra note 2, at 4 ("[T]he [clean hands] doctrine
produced effect only in the context of diplomatic protection."). "In proceedings
between States the [clean hands] doctrine was inapplicable. However, where a case
involved an individual and a State via diplomatic protection, the doctrine was
relevant." Id. at 15.
5. ILC Meeting 2791, supra note 2, at 10.
6. See discussion infra Parts I-III (analyzing the application of the clean hands
doctrine to diplomatic protection and inter-State disputes, and whether the doctrine
is a question of admissibility or substantive law).
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a condition for the admissibility of diplomatic protection into the
ILC's Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection.7
Defining the place of the clean hands doctrine in the law of
diplomatic protection has both theoretical and practical significance.
Diplomatic protection is undoubtedly an important tool in human
rights protection.' The application of the clean hands doctrine to
diplomatic protection may have far-reaching consequences on the
law of diplomatic protection and human rights in general. For
example, diplomatic protection may be rendered inadmissible in
cases similar to LaGrand9 and Avena if the doctrine of clean hands is
applied.1" It may also have a general negative impact on human
7. See discussion infra Parts IV-V (revealing the lack of jurisprudential
support for the clean hands doctrine in the context of diplomatic protection and
arguing that its application would be problematic).
8. See First Report of the International Law Commission on Diplomatic
Protection, U.N. Int'l L. Comm'n, 52nd Sess., at 10, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/506(2000) [hereinafter ILC First Report] (submitting that most countries treat a State's
claim of diplomatic protection more seriously than an individual's complaint).
9. See LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466, 488-89 (June 27)(denying a United States claim that Germany was precluded from asking the
United States to adhere to criminal justice standards by which Germany itself did
not abide). The Court cited the United States' inability to prove that Germany's
own practice failed to conform to the standards it demanded from the UnitedStates. Id. at 489. Therefore, the Court did not need to decide whether the United
States' argument, if true, would have rendered Germany's submissions
inadmissible. Id.
10. See Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.),
2004 I.C.J. 1, 45-47 (Mar. 31) (dismissing the United States' objection, similar
to that advanced in LaGrand, that the United States was being held to a different
standard of international law under Mexico's interpretation of Article 36 of theVienna Convention). The Court held that even if the United States had shown that
Mexico's practice in regard to the treaty was not beyond reproach, "this would not
constitute a ground of objection to the admissibility of Mexico's claim." Id. 47.
A recent example of the African Pride case seems well fit to provide a practical
framework for further discussion of the clean hands doctrine and its application to
the law of diplomatic protection. In October 2003, the Nigerian Navy arrested
some of the crew members of a vessel named African Pride, including twelve
nationals of the Russian Federation. The vessel was allegedly smuggling 11,300
tons of crude oil worth about $2.5 million. See Trial of Russian 'Oil Smugglers'
Adjourned to May in Nigeria, XINCHUA NEWS AGENCY, Mar. 22, 2005; Brimah
Kamara, Russian Envoy Hails Russo-Nigerian Relation, ALL AFR., Jan. 4, 2005.
The African Pride flew the Panamanian flag, belonged to a Greek shipping
company, and was chartered to a Nigerian firm. See Moscow Working on
[20:829
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Releasing Russian Sailors in Nigeria, INTERFAX NEWS SERVICE, May 30, 2005.
Reportedly, the vessel was arrested in neutral waters off the Nigerian coast. See
Russian Sailors Detained in Nigeria May Face Life Sentence, Russ. COURIER
INFO. PORTAL, May 30, 2005 [hereinafter Russian Sailors], available at
http://www.russiancourier.com/eng/news/ 3 1/5/2005/1917/ (last visited June 1,
2005). The crew members, currently facing a life sentence, maintain that they were
not aware of the contents that were loaded, and acted strictly under instructions
from the vessel owner. See Chica Amanze-Nwachuku, Illegal Bunkering: Trial
Continues June 8, ALL AFR., June 3, 2004; Andrey Stenin, Rossiiskie Moryaki ne
Vinesut Prigovora [Russian Sailors Will Not Survive the Verdict], GAZETA,
available at http://www.gazeta.ru/2005/05/
3 0/oa 159104.shtml (last visited June
1, 2005); see also Russian Sailors, supra. It appears that the Russian embassy in
Lagos, Nigeria, was not informed of the arrest of the Russian nationals in a timely
manner. See Boris Pilnikov, Russian Embassy in Nigeria Probing into Tanker
Crew Arrest, ITAT-TASS WORLD SERVICE, Oct. 23, 2003. According to a letter by
Alexander Yakovenko, the Spokesman of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
initially the conditions of the arrested crew members were "tolerable," but it
changed abruptly after the hijacking of the vessel, which was reportedly done with
the help of the crew remaining on board the African Pride. See Letter from
Alexander Yakovenko, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, to
the Izvestia Editors (May 30, 2005) [hereinafter Yakovenko Letter], available at
http://www.ln.mid.ruibrp_4.nsf/e78a48070f128a7b43256999005bcbb3/cfc84793c4
2f296c32570120037889f?OpenDocument (last visited June 1, 2005). This act was
perceived by the Nigerian authorities as a "criminal plot" and, as a result, detention
conditions of previously arrested crew "worsened considerably." See id.
Reportedly, the Russian nationals are currently being held in the Kiriki Maximum
Security Prison. See Kamara, supra. They were refused release on bail and were
reportedly brought to the court in chains. See id.; Amanze-Nwachuku, supra.
According to media reports, the arrested crew members are placed in groups of
three people, chained, and held in one-man prison cells that are two by three
meters. See Stenin, supra. Reportedly, the detainees are fed irregularly and
continuously suffer from tropical diseases, largely due to the temperature in prison
cells, which sometimes reaches fifty plus celsius. See id. The Nigerian authorities
have reportedly refused the doctor from the Russian embassy in Lagos to provide
medical assistance to detainees. See Yakovenko Letter, supra. Repeated attempts
by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to assist the arrested crewman remain
unanswered by the Government of Nigeria. It should be noted, however, that the
families of the arrested crew members have repeatedly pointed out the
insufficiency of efforts on the part of the Government of Russia to address the
matter. In the beginning of March, the family members declared a hunger strike to
attract attention of the authorities to the issue (see Sergei Perov, Moryaki
Golodayut v Nigerii, a ih Zheni - v Novorossiiske [Sailors are Starving in Nigeria,
and Their Wives - in Novorossiysk]; Adam Corbett, Crew Wives in Desperate Plea
for Help, TRADEWINDS, Apr. 1, 2005, at 38. According to the Russian Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, the Government of Nigeria claims that "this problem is in the
legal field," and "any attempts to exert pressure on the court are unlawful."
Yakovenko Letter, supra. Meanwhile, the conditions of the arrested crew members
.. ..... n ..........
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rights protection by compromising its universal application; that is,
because the clean hands doctrine subjects the exercise of diplomatic
protection to limitations of the domestic legal system of a State
which allegedly committed the international'y wrongful act.
This article argues that the exercise of diplomatic protection
cannot be and should not be limited by the doctrine of clean hands
for a number of reasons. Perhaps the main reason for this is because
the clean hands doctrine, which seems to be nothing more than
another name for the principle of good faith, cannot be used to
question the admissibility of a claim." The clean hands doctrine is an
issue of substantive law and should be employed, if appropriate, at
the stage of the consideration of merits. 2 In application, this means
that the clean hands doctrine would come into play only when
diplomatic protection has already been exercised and the
international tribunal is considering the claim. 3 Consequently, the
ILC should not include a requirement of "clean hands" in its current
codification of the law of diplomatic protection.
I. THE APPLICATION OF THE CLEAN HANDS DOCTRINE
TO DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION
The clean hands doctrine is not a novelty of international law.
Being closely related to notions of equity and good faith, the doctrine
finds some of its earlier expressions in the works of eighteenth-
century writers, particularly Richard Francis, who stated: "He that
hath committed Iniquity, shall not have equity."' 4 The application of
the doctrine in domestic legal systems varies from State to State and
of the African pride continue to deteriorate. See Sergei Perov, Zheni Arestovannih
v Nigerii Rossiiskih Moryakov Edut v Sud [Wifes of Russian Sailors Arrested inNigeria are Heading for the Court], NOVIE IZVESTIYA, May 30, 2005; Stenin,
supra.
11. See discussion infra Part III (arguing that the clean hands doctrine can onlybe examined once diplomatic protection has already been exercised, thus making it
relevant only at the merits stage).
12. See discussion infra Conclusion (concluding that the clean hands doctrineis an established part of international law and is substantive in nature).
13. See discussion infra Conclusion (citing various international tribunals'practice of characterizing preliminary objections as related to questions of merit
and refusing to consider their validity at the preliminary stage).
14. RICHARD FRANCIS, MAXIMS OF EQUITY 5 (1727).
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from one area of law to another. Most commonly, the clean hands
doctrine is understood as requiring that a party claiming equitable
relief or asserting an equitable defense has itself acted in accordance
with equitable principles.15 Some sources mention willful intent of
the initial wrongful conduct and a causal link between inequitable
conduct of both parties as conditions for the application of the clean
hands doctrine. 6
In relation to diplomatic protection, the clean hands doctrine can
be viewed in three ways. 7 First, the clean hands doctrine can
15. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 268 (8th ed. 2004) (defining clean hands as
"the principle that a party may not seek equitable relief or assert an equitable
defense if that party has violated an equitable principle, such as good faith"); see
also William J. Lawrence, III, The Application of the Clean Hands Doctrine in
Damage Actions, 57 NOTRE DAME LAW. 673, 674 (1982) (explaining that the
doctrine is "a matter of sound discretion for the court, and should never prevent a
court 'from doing justice"'). Other views on the clean hands doctrine have been
expressed as well. For example, in his dissenting opinion in Chapman v. United
Kingdom, Judge Bonello referred to the doctrine of clean hands as a "classic
constitutional doctrine," which "precludes those who are in prior contravention of
the law from claiming the law's protection." Chapman v. United Kingdom, 33 Eur.
Ct. H.R. 339, 440-41 (2001).
16. See Lawrence, supra note 15, at 674 (finding that the willful conduct
usually comprises "fraud, illegality, unfairness, or bad faith").
17. The ILC defines diplomatic protection as consisting of "resort to diplomatic
action or other means of peaceful settlement by a State adopting in its own right
the cause of its national in respect of an injury to that national arising from an
internationally wrongful act of another State." See Report of the International Law
Commission on the Work of its Fifty-fifth Session, U.N. GAOR, 58th Sess., Supp.
No. 10, 152-53, U.N. Doc. A/58/10 (2003) [hereinafter ILC 55th Session
Report] (outlining the ILC's current Draft Articles on diplomatic protection),
available at http://www.un.org/law/ilc/reports/2003/2003report.htm (last visited
Jan. 29, 2005). Diplomatic protection from the outset produces the impression of
an established area of international law. Contrary to this opinion, however,
diplomatic protection is a changing area of law in which many vital questions
remain unanswered. This can largely be explained by the fact that diplomatic
protection is (again contrary to wide-spread opinion) a "comparatively modem
phenomenon in the evolution of the state, in constitutional and in international
law." Edwin Borchard, Basic Elements of Diplomatic Protection of Citizens
Abroad, 7 AM. J. INT'L L. 497, 497 (1913). As stated by Borchard, "[n]ot until the
legal position of the state toward individuals, both of its own citizens and aliens,
and of states between themselves, had become clearly defined in modem public
law, did diplomatic protection become a factor in international intercourse." Id. An
important point needs to be made about the ILC's definition of diplomatic
AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
preclude a State from exercising diplomatic protection if it has acted
in a similar manner to foreign nationals. Second, the doctrine may
preclude diplomatic protection when the protecting State acted
unlawfully in a particular case involving its national and
consequently made its hands unclean. Third, the clean hands doctrine
can be viewed as precluding a State from exercising diplomatic
protection if its allegedly injured national suffered an injury as a
consequence of his/her own wrongful conduct." The third
interpretation is the one that is at issue at the ILC. This interpretation
substantially differs from the two other interpretations mentioned
above because it suggests a link between the initial wrongful conduct
of an injured alien and the subsequent wrongful conduct of a State.
Perhaps more importantly, the suggested purpose of applying the
clean hands doctrine to diplomatic protection in this third scenario is
to preclude the State from exercising such protection when the initial
wrongful conduct was performed not by the State, but by its
national. '9
protection. From the textual interpretation of the ILC's definition of diplomatic
protection it may seem that diplomatic protection may be exercised only in cases
when an alien suffers an injury from an internationally wrongful act of a State. See
ILC 55th Session Report, supra note 17, 152. Obviously, such a view is
inconsistent with the nature and practice of diplomatic protection, especially
considering the broad scope of the term adopted by the ILC (as including both
adjudicatory and non-adjudicatory measures, such as assistance in obtaining legal
and consular help). The confusion that Draft Article 1 causes in this regard needs
clarification by the ILC in its commentaries on Draft Articles on Diplomatic
Protection.
18. See Sixth Report of the International Law Commission on Diplomatic
Protection, U.N. Int'l L. Comm'n, 57th Sess., at 2, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/546 (2005)
[hereinafter ILC Sixth Report] (outlining the various arguments that support the
application of the clean hands doctrine to this interpretation of diplomatic
protection).
19. Even though, according to traditional understanding of diplomatic
protection, the State becomes sole claimant by taking over a claim of its national, it
does not mean that the initial wrongful conduct of an alien becomes attributable to
its State of nationality. For a discussion on state responsibility, see the ILC's Draft
Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wronjgful Acts, U.N. GAOR,
56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 29, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001). The Draft Articles
stated, inter alia, that "[als a general principle, the conduct of private persons or
entities is not attributable to the State under international law." Id. at 103.
836 [20:829
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The analysis of the applicability of the clean hands doctrine to
diplomatic protection is based on a twofold test.20 The first element
considers whether or not the clean hands doctrine has applicability to
inter-State disputes, since diplomatic protection is still predominantly
viewed as based on the "injury to the State" fiction. 2' The second
element considers whether or not the doctrine of clean hands can be
used as a question of admissibility.2 If both of these questions are
answered positively, it can be said that the doctrine of clean hands is
a prerequisite for exercising diplomatic protection.23
In addition to the test outlined above, a second test is required to
analyze the necessity of including the clean hands doctrine in the
ILC's Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection. On top of addressing
the two questions presented in the first test, it would have to be
shown that positive answers to these questions are supported by both
secondary and primary authority. 4 Alternatively, it would need to be
demonstrated that inclusion of the doctrine of clean hands in the law
of diplomatic protection would progressively develop international
law. 5
The analysis below shows that in both tests, the only question
answered positively is that of the applicability of the clean hands
doctrine to inter-State disputes.2 6 Consequently, the clean hands
doctrine is not a condition of admissibility for diplomatic protection
20. See discussion infra Parts II-III (analyzing the clean hands doctrine under
both prongs of the twofold test).
21. See discussion infra Part II (finding that the clean hands doctrine has been
applied in inter-State disputes).
22. See discussion infra Part III (revealing little support for the proposition that
the doctrine of clean hands is a question of the admissibility of a claim).
23. See discussion infra Conclusion (concluding that the clean hands doctrine
is not an established prerequisite for diplomatic protection and therefore should not
be incorporated into the ILC's Draft Articles).
24. See discussion infra Part IV (analyzing the authorities often cited in support
of the application of the clean hands doctrine to diplomatic protection).
25. See discussion infra Part V (discussing the potential impact of interpreting
the clean hands doctrine as a preliminary objection to admissibility in the context
of protecting human rights).
26. See discussion infra Part II (arguing that diplomatic protection's "injury to
the State" fiction forms the basis for an inter-State dispute).
8372005]
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and should not be included as such in the ILC's Draft Articles on
Diplomatic Protection.
II. IS THE CLEAN HANDS DOCTRINE APPLICABLE TO
INTER-STATE DISPUTES?
During the ILC's fifty-sixth session, an argument was expressed
that the doctrine of clean hands has no applicability to inter-State
disputes and only comes into play when diplomatic protection is
exercised. 2  Alain Pellet supported this view, but nevertheless
conceded that the concept of clean hands "was not very different
from the general principle of good faith in the context of relations
between States, and had no autonomous consequences and little
practical effect on the general rules of international responsibility. 28
Considering that Alain Pellet claims that the doctrine of clean hands
has no significance in inter-State disputes, his view seems to imply
that the principle of good faith also has no applicability in inter-State
disputes.29 This position is incorrect because apart from denying the
role of the principle of good faith in international law, it also
assumes that diplomatic protection has nothing to do with inter-State
disputes.3" Contrary to this view, diplomatic protection is currently
understood in international law as a way to bring an individual's
claim into the inter-State realm. Implicit in the concept of diplomatic
protection is the notion that "once a state has taken up a case on
behalf of one of its subjects before an international tribunal, in the
eyes of the latter the state is sole claimant."'" This so-called "injury
27. See ILC Meeting 2793, supra note 2, at 4 ("[T]he [clean hands] doctrine
produced effect only in the context of diplomatic protection."). "In proceedings
between States the [clean hands] doctrine was inapplicable. However, where a case
involved an individual and a State via diplomatic protection, the doctrine was
relevant." Id. at 15.
28. Id. at 4.
29. See infra note 33 and accompanying text (explaining that the doctrine of
clean hands and the doctrine of good faith are close if not similar).
30. See infra note 33 and accompanying text (citing several sources that
describe good faith as a fundamental principle of international law).
31. See Case of the Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Greece v. U.K.),
1925 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 2, at 12 (Aug. 30) (stating that although the dispute
originated between a private person and Great Britain, the Greek government's
[20:829
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to the State" fiction represents the basis of the ILC's current work on
diplomatic protection.32 By exercising diplomatic protection, the
State brings the claim of its national to the State-to-State level,
making it an inter-State dispute.
The clean hands doctrine is indeed very close, if not similar, to the
principle of good faith, which is an established general principle of
law, and to the rule prohibiting one from benefiting from his/her own
wrongful conduct, which is also considered by some scholars to be a
general principle of law.33 Consequently, the place of the clean hands
intervention rendered the dispute ripe for review by the Permanent Court of
International Justice).
32. Suggestions have been expressed to move away from the "injury to the
State fiction" towards describing diplomatic protection in terms of agency-type
relationships. See ILC First Report, supra note 8, at 6-7, 24. This discussion is
related to the nature of citizenship and nationality, which some authors claim to be
of contractual character. See, e.g., Borchard, supra note 17, at 503.
33. See HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
BY THE INTERNATIONAL COURT 167-69 (1982) (discussing the role of the general
principles of law in the jurisprudence of the ICJ); see also MALCOLM N. SHAW,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 97-99 (5th ed. 2003) (describing good faith as a background
principle that helps shape the law and limits the manner in which rules may be
applied); Vladimir-Djuro Degan, Some Objective Features in Positive
International Law, in THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AT THE THRESHOLD OF THE
21ST CENTURY 128 (1996) (equating good faith to other general principles of law
including prescription and circumstances negating the wrongfulness of an act like
necessity and self-defense); IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 19 (5th ed. 1998) (including good faith among other types of
general international law principles such as consent, reciprocity and equality of
states); BIN CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL
COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 157 (1953) (stating that "the principle is of such a
fundamental character that where an award disregarded it, a State, even if the
award were in its favour, would hesitate to insist upon its enforcement"); Legal
Status of Eastern Greenland (Den. v. Nor.), 1933 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 53, at 95
(Apr. 5) (Anzilotti, J., dissenting) (arguing that "an unlawful act cannot serve as
the basis of an action at law"); Legal Consequences for States of the Continued
Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding the
Security Council Resolution 276, 1971 I.C.J. 16, 46 (Advisory Opinion) (June 21)
("One of the fundamental principles governing the international relationship thus
established, is that a party which disowns or does not fulfill its own obligations
cannot be recognized as retaining the rights it claims to derive from the
relationship."); Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 253, 268 (Dec. 20) ("One
of the basic principles governing the creation and performance of legal obligations,
whatever their source, is the principle of good faith."); Diversion of Water from the
Meuse (Neth. v. Belg.), 1937 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 70, at 25 (June 28) (ruling that
8392005]
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doctrine in international law can hardly be disputed." It should be
noted, however, that international tribunals are rather reluctant to
apply the clean hands doctrine even at the stage of consideration of
merits.35 The exact relation of the clean hands doctrine to the
principle of good faith and the principle that no one can benefit from
his/her own wrong is unclear.3 6 Oral and written pleadings of some
States in front of international tribunals create an impression that
parties often use the term "clean hands" as a substitute for the term
"good faith. 37 Attempts to explain the relationship between these
under the circumstances the court found it "difficult to admit that the Netherlands
are now warranted in complaining of the construction and operation of a lock of
which they themselves set an example in the past"); Case Concerning the Factory
at Chorzow (F.R.G. v. Pol.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 9, at 31 (July 26) (stating
that
It is, moreover, a principle generally accepted in the jurisprudence of
international arbitration, as well as by municipal courts, that one Party cannot
avail himself of the fact that the other has not fulfilled some obligation or has
not had recourse to some means of redress, if the former Party has, by some
illegal act, prevented the latter from fulfilling the obligation in question, or
from having recourse to the tribunal which would have been open to him.).
34. See Stephen M. Schwebel, Clean Hands in the Court, in THE WORLD
BANK, INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 74-78 (1999) (providing further discussion on the role of the
clean hands doctrine in international law and arguments in support of its
significance).
35. See discussion infra Part III (explaining that international tribunals make
special efforts not to impinge on the merits of a claim whenever possible).
36. See Ted L. Stein, Contempt, Crisis and the Court: The World Court and the
Hostage Rescue Attempt, 76 AM. J. INT'LL. 499, 529 n. 134 (1982) (suggesting that
the rule that a party may not profit from its own wrongdoing "is related to, but
admittedly somewhat distinct from, the 'unclean hands' doctrine in that it bears
directly on the foundation of the plaintiffs right, rather than merely on the
availability of a remedy"); see also F. GARCIA-AMADOR ET AL., RECENT
CODIFICATION OF THE LAW OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURIES TO ALIENS 127
(1974) (referencing examples of where the prohibition from benefiting from one's
own wrongful conduct may be referred to as the clean hands doctrine).
37. A good example from the practice of the European Court of Human Rights
is Van der Tang v. Spain, in which the Spanish government in its preliminary
objection referred to the doctrine of clean hands, whereas it could have with the
same success referred to the principle of good faith. 22 Eur. Ct. H.R. 363, 381
(1993). On Van der Tang and existing erroneous interpretations of this case in the
context of the clean hands doctrine, see infra note 132. Similar examples are
present as well in the practice of the International Court of Justice. See generally
Case Concerning Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 1 (Nov. 5) (Courter-
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concepts can be best described in words of the "godfathers" of
Russian science fiction, Arkady and Boris Strugatsky: "it is the same
as describing a glass or, god-forbid, a wine-glass: you just move your
fingers and curse from the absolute futility of your attempts."38 The
ambiguous difference between these doctrines of international law
produced a debate over whether the doctrine of clean hands is a
distinct general principle of law in its own right. Ian Brownlie, a
member of the ILC, stated that he "had never been convinced that the
clean hands doctrine was part of the general international law."3 9
Charles Rousseau expressed a similar position stating "it is not
possible to consider the theory of clean hands as an institution of
general customary law."40 Some scholars, however, go as far as
claiming that the clean hands doctrine is "undoubtedly" a general
principle of law in its own right.41 An interesting comment on the
status of the clean hands doctrine was expressed by Luis Garcia-
Arias, who pointed out that he failed to find any cases "adjudicated
before international tribunals where the doctrine of 'clean hands' has
been applied directly," but nevertheless admitted that "there are cases
where the essence of this doctrine has been alluded to."'42 It seems
that every time anyone uses the phrase "clean hands" in primary or
secondary sources, the assumption is made by the international legal
community that it is somehow distinct from the principle of good
faith and the principle of prohibition of benefiting from one's own
wrongful conduct. However, case law analysis shows that clean
Memorial and Counter-Claim in U.S. Preliminary Objections, June 23, 1997);
(Nicar. v. U.S.), 1991 I.C.J. 47 (Sept. 26) (dissenting opinions); Case Concerning
the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 1 (Feb. 14).
38. ARKADY STRUGATSKY & BORIS STRUGATSKY, PIKNIK NA OBOCHINE
[ROADSIDE PICNIC] ("eto vse ravno chto stakan komu-nibud' opisivat', ili, ne dai
bog, ryumku: tolko paltsami shevelish i chertihaeshsya ot polnogo bessiliya.").
39. ILCMeeting 2791, supra note 2, at 11.
40. CHARLES ROUSSEAU, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 177 (1983).
41. See CHRISTOPHER R. ROSSI, EQUITY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: A LEGAL
REALIST APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL DECISIONMAKING 165 (1993) (arguing
that socialist and continental judges, not just those trained in the common law,
have applied the doctrine).
42. Luis Garcia-Arias, La Doctrine des "Clean Hands" en Droit International
Public, in ANNUAIRE DES ANCIENS AUDITEURS DE L'ACADtMIE DE DROIT
INTERNATIONAL 18 (1960).
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hands is often nothing but a category used to express the subjective
legal status of one of the parties in cases where one of the two
abovementioned principles is applied.43 Regardless of whether we
understand the clean hands doctrine as a separate legal concept
related to notions of equity and good faith, or as a synonym for the
principle of good faith, it seems doubtless that it has been referred to
and applied in many inter-State disputes.44
III. IS THE CLEAN HANDS DOCTRINE A QUESTION OF
ADMISSIBILITY OR SUBSTANTIVE LAW?
The question addressed in this section is detrimental to the
discussion of the role of the clean hands doctrine in the area of
diplomatic protection.45 Is this doctrine a defense at the stage of the
consideration of the merits of a claim, or a condition for the
admissibility of the claim? Several scholars are of the opinion that
the clean hands doctrine is a question of admissibility, and as such,
may be raised as an objection to the exercise of diplomatic
protection.46 Addressing grounds for inadmissibility, Ian Brownlie
43. See CHENG, supra note 33, at 156 (referencing The Good Return Cases, in
which an American member of the Ecuadorian-United States Claims Commission
asked: "Can [Captain Clark] be allowed, as far as the United States are concerned,
to profit by his own wrong?" and stated that "[a] party who asks for redress must
present himself with clean hands"); see also Schwebel, supra note 34, at 74-78
(failing to explain how this doctrine differs from the principle of good faith and the
rule prohibiting benefiting from one's own wrongful conduct).
44. It is interesting to note that Alain Pellet, who rejected the application of the
clean hands doctrine to inter-State disputes, himself pointed out that:
[A] situation in which a State complaining of a violation of international law
by another State had itself violated international law neither afforded grounds
for inadmissibility nor constituted a circumstance precluding wrongfulness. In
the context of inter-state relations, the fact that two States were in violation of
international law did not preclude the responsibility of both States being
invoked.
ILC Meeting 2793, supra note 2, at 3.
45. See discussion infra Part III (highlighting the importance of determining
how to apply the clean hands doctrine).
46. See, e.g., JAMES CRAWFORD, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION'S
ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY 162 (2002) (arguing that "the so-called 'clean
hands' doctrine has been invoked principally in the context of the admissibility of
claims before international courts and tribunals, though rarely applied"); see
Gerald Fitzmaurice, The General Principles of International Law Considered from
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referred to the doctrine of clean hands as one of many "instances in
which questions of inadmissibility and 'substantive' issues are
difficult to distinguish." 47 The view that the clean hands doctrine may
render a claim inadmissible finds support in Judge Schwebel's
dissenting opinion in the Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary
Activities in and Against Nicaragua48 and the dissenting opinion of
Judge Van den Wyngaert in the recently decided Case Concerning
the Arrest Warrant of ]] April 2000.
49
Numerous secondary sources, primarily emanating from French
legal jurisprudence, refer to the clean hands doctrine as rendering
diplomatic protection inadmissible in those cases in which an alien's
wrongful conduct caused the internationally wrongful conduct of a
State.50 Inclusion of the clean hands doctrine in the Draft Article on
the Standpoint of the Rule of Law, in RECUEIL DES COURS DE L'ACADEMIE DE
DROIT INTERNATIONAL 119 (1957) (noting that
a State which is guilty of illegal conduct may be deprived of the necessary
locus standi in judicio for complaining of corresponding illegalities on the
part of other States, especially if these were consequential on or were
embarked upon in order to counter its own illegality-in short were provoked
by it).
47. See BROWNLIE, supra note 33, at 508 (clarifying that a claimant's illegal
activity under either a municipal or international claim could potentially bar the
claim under the doctrine of clean hands).
48. (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 394 (June 27) (Schwebel, J., dissenting)
(suggesting that Nicaragua's conduct
should have been reason enough for the Court to hold that Nicaragua had
deprived itself of the necessary locus standi to complain of corresponding
illegalities on the part of the United States, especially because, if these were
illegalities, they were consequential on or were embarked upon in order to
counter Nicaragua's own illegality-'in short were provoked by it').
49. (Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 1, 84 (Feb. 14) (Van den Wyngaert, J.,
dissenting) (claiming that "the Congo did not come to the International Court with
clean hands, and its Application should have been rejected").
50. See PETER MALANCZUK, AKEHURST'S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO
INTERNATIONAL LAW 269 (1997) (theorizing that if a State cannot make a claim
for a national who suffered an injury due to his own activities then the injury
suffered by the national should be "roughly proportional" to the impropriety of the
activity); see also EDWIN M. BORCHARD, THE DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION OF
CITIZENS ABROAD OR THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS 735 (1915)
(emphasizing that when one of its citizens violates the law of another country, a
government such as the United States would do little more than secure a fair trial
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Diplomatic Protection was discussed at several sessions of the
International Law Commission, and was specifically addressed at its
fifty-sixth session in 2004. 1' Alain Pellet expressed the position of
proponents of the applicability of the clean hands doctrine to
diplomatic protection at the ILC, stating:
If a private individual who enjoyed diplomatic protection violated either
the internal law of the protecting State - and it should be noted that
internal law played no role at all in cases involving relations between
States - or international law, then in the general context of the claim, the
State called upon to exercise protection could no longer do so. 52
It was suggested at the ILC that the clean hands doctrine refers to
the question of the admissibility of a claim. 3 Alain Pellet went even
as far as saying that the "absence of the clean hands doctrine will
and ensure a proportionate punishment); B. SEN, A DIPLOMAT'S HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 372 (3d ed. 1988) (highlighting that as long
as an arrested alien receives a minimum standard of care throughout his detention,
there will be minimal intervention by the alien's country); JEAN SALMON,
DICTIONNAIRE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 677-78 (2001) (maintaining that
the International Law Commission, in its project of international responsibility,
mandated that the responsibility of a State should not be invocated if: 1) the
request was not presented in conformity with the applicable rules of the subject of
the nationality of the complaints and 2) if all of the internal domestic remedies
haven't been exhausted in a case where the request is subjugated); DAVID Ruzit,
DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 95 (14th ed. 1999) (arguing that in the theory of
clean hands, the victim does not have the ability to reproach the incorrect behavior
due to her carelessness); ROBERT KOLB, LA BONNE FoI EN DROIT INTERNATIONAL
PUBLIC 568-571 (2000) (stating that clean hands may not become a criteria of a
discretionary provision to afford diplomatic protection and that a State cannot
present an international reclamation unless the reprehensible behavior of its alien
was the primary cause to amplify the wrong); DOMINIQUE CARREAU, DROIT
INTERNATIONAL 460-74 (7th ed. 2001) (discussing the application of the clean
hands doctrine to diplomatic protection); JEAN COMBACAU & SERGE SUR, DROIT
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 596-97 (5th ed. 2001) (discussing the clean hands
doctrine); Garcia-Arias, supra note 42, at 14-22 (stating that even though there is a
certain lack of primary sources supporting the application of the clean hands
doctrine, the doctrine itself has been "alluded to").
51. See Diplomatic Protection, supra note 3 (outlining the general provisions
of diplomatic protection).
52. See ILC Meeting 2793, supra note 2, at 4.
53. See id. at 3-5 (arguing for a need to incorporate the clean hands doctrine
into the law of diplomatic protection).
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paralyze the exercise of diplomatic protection. 54 However, there was
no agreement at the ILC on whether clean hands is a condition of
admissibility or an issue of substantive law raised during the
consideration of merits. Interestingly, Alain Pellet, the fiercest
supporter of the clean hands doctrine at the ILC, acknowledged that
in inter-State disputes, "no court had ever subsequently found that
the [clean hands doctrine] automatically rendered a claim
inadmissible. 55
The position that the clean hands doctrine is a question of
admissibility is incorrect. The clean hands doctrine is a question of
substantive law, not a procedural question referring to the
admissibility of the claim, and may be raised and considered during
the consideration of merits and examined on a case-by-case basis. 6
The result of this is that the clean hands doctrine cannot preclude
States from exercising diplomatic protection, since it will be
considered when the diplomatic protection has already been
exercised.57
At preliminary proceedings, international tribunals try not to
impinge upon the merits, when possible.58 For instance, the
International Court of Justice ("ICJ") may declare at the stage of the
consideration of preliminary objections, inter alia, that objections are
54. Id. at 4.
55. Id. at 3.
56. See discussion infra notes 60-71 and accompanying text (providing a
collection of cases in which the Court chose to consider preliminary objections
later in the case when it considered merits).
57. See discussion infra notes 60-71 and accompanying text (suggesting that
States will or will not already have chosen to exercise diplomatic protection by the
time that the clean hands doctrine is raised).
58. See SHABTAI ROSENNE, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
COURT 459 (1985) (describing this as a "rough rule-of-thumb," according to which
it is probable that when the facts and arguments in support of the objection are
substantially the same as the facts and arguments on which the merits of the
case depend, or when to decide the objection would require decision on what,
in the concrete case, are substantive aspects of the merits, the plea is not an
objection but a defence to merits).
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possibly valid but not of an exclusively preliminary character. 9 The
Court may then join the objection to the consideration of the merits,
or one of the parties may bring it up later as a defense at the stage of
the consideration of merits.60 The Court has declared preliminary
objections as related to questions of merits in several cases, including
the Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and
Against Nicaragua,6' Right of Passage Over Indian Territory,62 and
Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited.63 The
Permanent Court of International Justice ("PCIJ") made similar
findings in both the Pajzs, Cs6ky, Esterhizy case' and the Losinger
& Co. case.65 In Norwegian Loans and ELSI, the parties agreed that
59. See id. at 459-60 (outlining a series of cases in which the Court recognized
objections at different stages throughout the trial). Furthermore, if the Court is not
satisfied that a plea advanced as a preliminary objection has been adequately
argued by the parties, they may raise the objection at a later stage. Id. at 460.
60. See id. (referring to Electric Company of Sofia & Bulgaria (Belg. v. Bulg.),
1939 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 79 (Dec. 5), in order to illustrate that "the rejection of
any such pleas as a preliminary objection, as opposed to its dismissal as such, is
without prejudice to the freedom of the parties to take it up again in support of
their case on the merits").
61. (Nicar. V. U.S.) 1986 I.C.J. 14, 29 (June 27) (declaring that the case at
hand "is the first in which the Court has had occasion to exercise the power first
provided for in the 1972 Rules of Court to declare that a preliminary objection
'does not possess, in the circumstances of the case, an exclusively preliminary
character"').
62. (Port. v. India), 1957 I.C.J. 125, 151-52, 174 (Nov. 26) (Judgment on
Preliminary Objections) (proclaiming that the Court often "join[s] the Objection to
the merits because the Court feels that it is impossible to arrive at a decision on[the] issue without investigating into the merits of the subject").
63. (Belg. v. Spain), 1964 I.C.J. 6, 45-46 (July 24) (Preliminary Objections)(deciding to join a preliminary objection to the merits because the Court had better
knowledge of the facts).
64. (Hung. v. Yugoslavia), 1936 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 66, at 9 (May 23)(Preliminary Objection) (finding that some questions raised by objections are "too
intimately related and too closely interconnected" for the Court to decided upon
the preliminary objections without considering the merits). Consequently,
proceedings on the merits "will place the Court in a better position to adjudicate
with a full knowledge of the facts [of the objections]." Id.
65. (Switz. v. Yugoslavia), 1936 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 67, at 24 (June 27)(Preliminary Objection) (reiterating that the Court has the ability to give its
decision upon an objection and on the merits in the same judgment).
[20:829
CLEAN HANDS & DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION
objections to admissibility should be heard and decided at the stage
of the consideration of merits.
66
According to the PCIJ in Pajzs, Cscky, Esterheizy, a preliminary
objection should join the consideration of merits when preliminary
objections and submissions on merits "are too intimately related and
too closely interconnected for the Court to be able to adjudicate upon
the former without prejudicing the latter. '67 Addressing such
objections at the merits stage would "enable the Court to obtain a
'clear understanding' of some aspects of the preliminary objections
and a 'full knowledge of facts' relating thereto. 68 Surely, a question
of the lack of clean hands, which has purely substantive character
and relates to attenuation or exoneration of responsibility, should be
addressed at the merits stage. In no ICJ cases has the Court supported
the clean hands doctrine as a preliminary objection to the
admissibility of a claim, and rightfully so, since the clean hands
doctrine is precisely a question of merits, as was recently
exemplified in the Case Concerning Oil Platforms.69 In the Counter-
Memorial and Counter-Claim submitted by the United States on June
66. See Certain Norwegian Loans (Fr. v. Nor.), 1957 I.C.J. 9, 22 (July 6)
(reporting that the French government asked the Court to attach the Norwegian
government's preliminary objections to the merits and that the Norwegian
government did not raise an objection to the request); see also Elettronica Sicula
S.P.A. (ELSI) (U.S. v. Italy), 1989 I.C.J. 15, 18 (July 20) (stating that in
congruence with Article 79, paragraph 8, of the Rules of the Court, the Parties to
the case agreed that the Court should hear and determine objections within the
framework of the merits); ROSENNE, supra note 58, at 459-60 (providing an
additional list of cases in which the ICJ dealt with the issue of addressing questions
raised as preliminary objections at the stage of consideration of merits);
LAUTERPACHT, supra note 33, at 113-15 (referring to a number of cases to
illustrate instances in which the Court joined the preliminary objection to the
merits).
67. Pajzs, Cscky, Esterhdzy, 1936 P.C.I.J. at 9 (finding that the objections
introduced in the Hungarian government's appeal should proceed on the merits to
provide the Court with a better understanding of the issues).
68. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 33, at 114 (providing the Court's rationale that
the preliminary objections may be considered to constitute part of the defense on
the merits).
69. (Iran v. U.S.) 2003 I.C.J. 1, 29-30 (Nov. 5) (deciding that the United
States' claim that Iran's conduct precludes it from relief should not be determined
at the preliminary stage since the Court "would have to examine Iranian and U.S.
actions in the Persian Gulf' for proper adjudication).
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23, 1997 in this case, the United States raised the doctrine of clean
hands as a preliminary objection to admissibility. 70 The Court
rejected this position and underlined that the clean hands doctrine
was of substantive character and went beyond the framework of
preliminary objections to admissibility:
The United States invites the Court to make a finding "that the United States
measures against the platforms were the consequence of Iran's own unlawful
uses of force" and submits that the "appropriate legal consequences should be
attached to that finding". The Court notes that in order to make that finding it
would have to examine Iranian and United States actions in the Persian Gulf
during the relevant period - which it has also to do in order to rule on the
Iranian claim and the United States counter-claim. 7'
IV. APPLICATION OF THE CLEAN HANDS DOCTRINE TO
DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION DOES NOT HAVE
SUBSTANTIAL SUPPORT AMONG PRIMARY AUTHORITY
Interestingly, there are numerous secondary sources supporting the
application of the clean hands doctrine to diplomatic protection,
including those by scholars from several different legal systems.72 A
typical argument marshalled by these authors is represented by a
quote from Edwin Borchard, who states, "It is a general rule that an
injury to an alien arising out of a breach of or failure to observe the
local law or police regulations involves a complete or partial
forfeiture by the alien of the protection of his own government."73
Most scholars supporting such a position come from the French
school of international law.74 Regrettably, they all fail to provide
solid references to decisions of international tribunals. When trying
70. See id. 101 (claiming that the United States filed a Counter-Claim against
Iran based on actions by Iran in the Persian Gulf which violated the 1955 Treaty).
71. Id. 29 (delaying the Court's consideration of the United States' request to
dismiss Iran's claim until the Court could conduct an examination of the merits).
72. See discussion supra note 50 and accompanying text (presenting a
compilation of international secondary sources that endorse the clean hands
doctrine).
73. BORCHARD, supra note 50, at 735 (noting that international commissions
have adhered to this rule).
74. See supra note 50 (providing a significant list of French sources by French
scholars suggesting that misconduct on the part of an alien will likely preclude him
or her from diplomatic protection in a foreign nation).
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to provide such references, advocates of the application of the clean
hands doctrine to diplomatic protection tend to repeat a limited
number of cases, namely Ben Tillett,7 5 the Virginius incident,76
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project,77 Case Concerning Oil Platforms,
and the dissenting opinion of Judge Van den Wyngaert in the Arrest
Warrant case. Some recent cases, in which some of the parties raised
the doctrine of clean hands, should also be mentioned, such as
Legality of the Use of Force"8 and Legal Consequences of the
Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory.79
75. See, e.g., KOLB, supra note 50, at 571 (reporting that the case involved a
British trade unionist who did not have clean hands); see ANTOINE PILLET & PAUL
FAUCHILLE, REVUE GENERALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 46-55 (1899)
(discussing a case involving a British national who traveled to Belgium to give a
speech at a meeting of dock workers and was deported back to Great Britain after a
brief detention). This case has been frequently and mistakenly cited by supporters
of the application of the clean hands doctrine to diplomatic protection. See
CARREAU, supra note 50, at 468 (summarizing the case and highlighting that the
British national broke Belgian laws and consequently did not have clean hands);
see also ILC Meeting 2793, supra note 2, at 4 (noting that
If a private individual who enjoyed diplomatic protection violated either the
internal law of the protecting State-and it should be noted that internal law
played no role at all in cases involving relations between States-or
international law, then in the general context of the claim, the State called
upon to exercise protection could no longer do so. A good example of such a
situation was the decision rendered in 1898 in the Ben Tillett arbitration case.
The solution applied in that case has subsequently been applied in numerous
cases in which the doctrine of "clean hands" effectively rendered a request for
diplomatic protection inadmissible.).
76. See JOHN BASSETT MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 895-903
(1906) (examining an incident in October of 1893 in which about a third of 155
crew members and passengers aboard a steamer flying an American flag and
having an American register were captured by a Spanish ship, tried by court-
martial, charged with piracy, and executed).
77. (Hung. v. Slovakia), 1997 I.C.J. 7 (Sept. 25) (presenting a scenario in
which the Court considered whether Hungary was permitted to suspend and
eventually abandon a project and whether the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic
could consequently construct a dam in the Danube river).
78. (Serb. & Mont. v. Belg.), 1999 I.C.J. 105 (June 2), 38 I.L.M. 950 (1999)
(Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures) (containing Yugoslavia's
argument that Belgium violated international law in its bombing campaign against
Yugoslavia); see Case Concerning Legality of Force (Serb. & Mont. v. U.K.), 1999
I.C.J. 1 (June 2) 38 I.L.M. 1167 (1999) (Preliminary Objections of the United
Kingdom) (expressing Yugoslavia's position that Great Britain "violated its
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The clean hands doctrine in the context of diplomatic protection
remains a primarily theoretical concept lacking jurisprudential
support. Several scholars have expressed criticism of the use of the
doctrine in international law.80 Interestingly, Alain Pellet - contrary
to the position he expressed during the meeting of the Drafting
Committee on Diplomatic Protection - has not included the
doctrine of clean hands in his scholarly works as a condition for the
admissibility of diplomatic protection."1 Outside of French legal
jurisprudence, Edwin Borchard, whose comments are somewhat
contradictory, makes references to the clean hands doctrine in
international obligation banning the use of force against another State" and "the
obligation not to intervene in the internal affairs of another State").
79. Advisory Opinion (I.C.J. July 9, 2004), 43 I.L.M. 1009 (2004) (disclosing
Palestine's complaint that Israel lacks compliance with International Law due to
the construction of the wall in the Palestinian territory); Construction of a Wall in
the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion (I.C.J. July 9, 2004), 43
I.L.M. 1009 (2004) (Written Statement of the Government of Israel on Jurisdiction
and Propriety).
80. See ROUSSEAU, supra note 40, at 172 (stating that the issue of violation of
national laws by a claimant is not a necessary element when considering the issue
of admissibility of a claim); see also Fitzmaurice, supra note 46, at 120 (discussing
the inapplicability of the clean hands doctrine in cases involving violations of
human rights and jus cogens norms); Gerard Cohen-Jonathan & Jean-Frangois
Flauss, Protection Internationale des Droits de L 'Homme, in ANNUAIRE FRANCAIS
DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 688 (2002) (expressing reservations about the use of the
doctrine in certain cases); Jean Salmon, Des "Main Propres" Comme Condition de
Recevabilit des Rclamations Internationales, in ANNUAIRE FRANCAIS DE DROIT
INTERNATIONAL 225-66 (1964) (stating that "if by theory of 'clean hands' we
mean that a government is entitled to refuse to exercise diplomatic protection on
behalf of an undeserving (unworthy) national, this theory is useless as it is nothing
more than a case of application of the discretionary character of diplomatic
protection").
81. See NGUYEN QUOC DINH, ALAIN PELLET & PATRICK DAILLER, DROIT
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 760-64 (5th ed. 1994) [hereinafter DROIT
INTERNATIONAL, 5th ed.] (discussing the conditions in which diplomatic protection
can be utilized and refraining from mentioning the doctrine of clean hands);
NGUYEN QUOC DINH, ALAIN PELLET & PATRICK DAILLER, DROIT INTERNATIONAL
PUBLIC 808-16 (7th ed. 2002) [hereinafter DROIT INTERNATIONAL, 7th ed.]
(summarizing issues of diplomatic protection, such as the nationality of the
protected individual, and the application and exhaustion of diplomatic remedies
problems posed by the abandonment of diplomatic protection, but not bringing to
light the issue of the clean hands doctrine).
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relation to diplomatic protection.82 Edwin Borchard cites several
cases and incidents in which States refrained from interfering in a
situation on behalf of their nationals.83 However, in each of these
cases, none of the States whose citizens were involved in the matter
were precluded from exercising diplomatic protection; instead, the
States made decisions not to interfere when their nationals had
unclean hands.84 As Edwin Borchard contends, even in situations of
violations of criminal law, "protection has not been absolutely
declined, but it has in general been strictly limited to securing a fair
trial and the application of the ordinary penalties or a concurrent
attempt to ameliorate the harshness of arbitrary measures."85 Thus,
Borchard's comments support the position that the breach of national
law (i.e., unclean hands) does not automatically render diplomatic
protection inapplicable, but may only impose limitations on
diplomatic protection at the discretion of the alien's State of
nationality. In short, the clean hands doctrine is one factor that a
State may take into consideration when deciding whether to exercise
diplomatic protection; more specifically, it is a way for a State to
avoid exercising diplomatic protection when choosing to do so.
Analysis of cases referred to by supporters of the application of
the clean hands doctrine to diplomatic protection shows that these
cases can be divided into two groups. The first group of cases
contains references to the clean hands doctrine in a State's
submissions or tribunals' opinions outside the context of diplomatic
82. See generally BORCHARD, supra note 50, at 733-36 (examining whether or
not diplomatic protection exists in relation to the clean hands doctrine).
83. See EDWIN BORCHARD, THE DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION OF CITIZENS
ABROAD OR THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS 713-91 (1928) (exploring
numerous instances in which an individual forfeits diplomatic protection on
account of his or her conduct).
84. See id. at 713 (arguing that in "those cases in which foreign offices or
international commissions have refused, or at least, limited the protection
ordinarily extended to injured citizens," it is "because the acts of the claimant
himself have made such protection unjustifiable either in whole or in part").
85. BORCHARD, supra note 50, at 734 (providing an example where Ireland
arrested many naturalized Americans suspected of inciting the Fenian movement,
and where the United States attempted to avoid interference outside of protecting
its innocent citizens that did not subject themselves to suspicion of complicity with
treasonable practices).
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protection, and includes cases such as: Van der Tang v. Spain; Case
Concerning Oil Platforms; Arrest Warrant; Gabcikovo-Nagymaros
Project; Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory; and Legality of the Use of Force.
The second group of cases provides a striking example of disputes
that arise when the clean hands doctrine could have been raised but
never was, and contains cases such as Ben Tillett and Virginius. For
example, in Case Concerning Oil Platforms, the clean hands doctrine
arose in connection with wrongful conduct carried out by Iran prior
to those actions by the United States that constituted the subject
matter of the case, and consequently had nothing to do with the
exercise of diplomatic protection.86 The same can be said about the
dissenting opinion of Judge Van den Wyngaert in the Arrest Warrant
case, in which she suggested rendering Congo's application
inadmissible on the basis of Congo's unclean hands.87 However,
Judge Van den Wyngaert did not speak of clean hands in the context
of diplomatic protection; instead, she referred to Congo's own failure
to carry out investigations and prosecutions as an indication of bad
faith, and consequently, a lack of clean hands.88 Another case often
referred to is Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project, but it has no relevance
to the clean hands doctrine in the context of diplomatic protection,
since it involved a direct State-to-State dispute.89 In Legal
Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
86. See Case Concerning Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 1, 29 (Nov.
5) (presenting the United States' request to the Court to find that the United States'
measures against the platforms resulted from Iran's unlawful use of force and
making no mention of diplomatic protection).
87. See Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Congo v.
Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 1, 84 (Feb. 14) (Van den Wyngaert, J., dissenting) (declaring
that any potential infringement of international obligation by Belgium is "trivial in
comparison" to the infringements of Congo).
88. See id. (alleging that Congo failed to comply with the obligations of Article
146 of the Fourth Geneva Convention because Congo did not investigate and
prosecute charges of war crimes or crimes against humanity committed within its
borders).
89. See Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project, (Hung. v. Slovakia), 1997 I.C.J. 7, 11
(Sept. 25) (outlining the dispute between the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic
(and later the Slovak Republic as the sole successor State in respect of rights and
obligations relating to the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project) and the Republic of
Hungary based upon the implementation and termination of the Treaty on the
Construction and Operation of the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Barrage System).
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Palestinian Territory and Legality of the Use of Force, the clean
hands doctrine was also brought up outside the context of diplomatic
protection. Moreover, in Legal Consequences of the Construction of
a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory the Court did not
address the clean hands argument raised in Israel's Written
Statement on Jurisdiction and Propriety. In Legality of the Use of
Force, the argument regarding Yugoslavia's unclean hands was also
not considered by the Court. It is also worth noting that in all of the
cases mentioned above (except for Judge Van den Wyngaert's
dissenting opinion in the Arrest Warrant case), the clean hands
doctrine, when addressed by the Court, was never examined as a
question of admissibility, but was always reviewed as a question of
merits.
Some scholars present the Ben Tillett and Virginius cases as two
historical examples of the effect of the clean hands doctrine on
diplomatic protection.90 Legal literature has not dedicated sufficient
discussion to either of these cases, which may be the reason why
they are repeatedly and erroneously cited as supporting the
application of the clean hands doctrine to diplomatic protection. For
example, Dominique Carreau provides Ben Tillett and Virginius as
examples in support of his position that diplomatic protection may
not be exercised over an individual that committed wrongful
conduct.91 Dominique Carreau states that "conduite bldmable" (in
other words, unclean hands) may exonerate the responsibility of the
State that committed an internationally wrongful act by rendering
diplomatic protection inadmissible or unfounded. 92 However, in both
Ben Tillett and Virginius, the parties never raised the issue of the
inadmissibility of diplomatic protection because of unclean hands. 93
There was an exercise of diplomatic protection in both of these cases,
90. See CARREAU, supra note 50, at 468 (stating that this type of behavior
would render diplomatic protection inadmissible, as well as attentuate or exonerate
the resonsibility of a State that committed the intemationally wrongful act).
91. See id. at 467-68 (stating that the individual for whom the state exercises or
intends to exercise diplomatic protection must not have been engaged in "wrongful
behavior").
92. See id.
93. See ILC Sixth Report, supra note 18, 11 (noting that the cases do not
invoke the language of the clean hands doctrine).
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and none of the opposing sides seemed to object to it. 94 Reference to
both of these cases seems to play a significant role during the
discussion of the role of the clean hands doctrine in diplomatic
protection, including debates at the ILC; therefore, they require
additional consideration. 95 An outline of these cases is presented
below.
96
A. THE VIRGINIUS INCIDENT 97
On October 31, 1873, a Spanish military vessel captured the
steamer Virginius on the high seas after an eight-hour chase. 98
Virginius flew a U.S. flag without a right to fly it, as the United
States later determined. 99 The steamer carried arms and ammunition
and was initially headed for Cuba."°° After the Spanish man-of-war
Tornado intercepted Virginius, it took Virginius to Santiago de Cuba,
where the Spanish court-martial declared that 53 out of 155 crew
members and passengers-including nationals of the United States,
Great Britain, and Cuba-were guilty of piracy and executed them. 10 1
Analysis of documents produced during negotiations between
Spain and the United States leaves no doubt that both parties agreed
that the United States had a right to exercise diplomatic protection in
94. See id. 13 (clarifying that there was no disagreement between the United
States and Spain about the right of the United States to exercise diplomatic
protection).
95. See id. 3 (summarizing the ILC arguments and debates regarding the
clean hands doctrine).
96. See discussion infra notes 97-115 and accompanying text (providing the
background of the Tillett and Virginius cases).
97. See MOORE, supra note 76, at 895-903 (involving Spanish charges of
piracy against the crew and passengers of a vessel carrying the U.S. flag).
98. See id. at 895 (noting that the entire pursuit took place on the high seas).
99. See id. at 898-99 (describing the Attorney General's opinion to the
President that the Virginius did not have a right to carry the U.S. flag at the time of
capture).
100. See id. at 896 (explaining that the vessel was heading to Cuba to aid in the
insurrection).
101. See id. at 895 (noting that Spain held the remaining crew members as
prisoners).
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this case."' Also, as evidenced from the conduct of negotiations
between the United States and Spain, both parties agreed that Spain
was not exonerated from responsibility for violation of international
law regardless of whether Virginius was engaged in transportation of
ammunition or rebels and had a right to fly the U.S. flag.103
Moreover, both the United States and Spain agreed that the United
States could represent its interests if it proceeded to arbitration,
which never occurred due to successful negotiations. °4 The protocol
of the conference held at the Department of State on November 29,
1873 between the United States and Spanish officials stated: "Other
reciprocal reclamations to be the subject of consideration and
arrangement between the two Governments; and, in case of no
agreement, to be the subject of arbitration, if the constitutional assent
of the Senate of the United States be given thereto."105
B. THE BEN TILLETT CASE
10 6
Ben Tillett was a national of Great Britain and an activist of the
labor union movement.10 7 On August 21, 1896, he arrived in Belgium
to participate in a meeting of dockworkers. 108 Authorities arrested
Tillett on the same day he arrived in Belgium, subsequently detained
him for several hours, and then deported him back to Great Britain.109
Great Britain claimed, on behalf of its national, that Belgium violated
102. See id. at 896 (providing the text of the protocol from a conference between
U.S. Secretary of State Hamilton Fish and Rear-Admiral Don Jos6 Palo de Bernabe
of Spain).
103. See id. at 895-903 (noting that Spain violated high seas freedoms of the
Virginius). The British Government also obtained compensation for families of
executed British subjects who were aboard Virginius. Id. at 903.
104. See id. at 897 (stating that the two governments would engage in arbitration
in the case of no agreement).
105. Id.
106. See PILLET & FAUCHILLE, supra note 75, at 46-55.
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its own law and demanded compensation of 75,000 francs."1 The
case proceeded to arbitration after negotiations failed."'
Analysis of the arbitration agreement between Belgium and Great
Britain and of the arbitral award show that the issue of the
inadmissibility of diplomatic protection was not even considered.1 2
Great Britain, however, undoubtedly exercised diplomatic protection
when it took over Ben Tillett's claim," 3 but ultimately lost the case
on substantive grounds. The main argument in favor of Belgium was
that the act the country committed was not an internationally
wrongful act." 4 Moreover, causation between Ben Tillett's injuries
and Belgium's actions could not be established." 5
V. PROBLEMS THAT WOULD ARISE THROUGH
APPLICATION OF THE CLEAN HANDS DOCTRINE TO
DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION
Even assuming that the clean hands doctrine is applicable to
diplomatic protection, the scope of its application appears unclear
and problematic. What types of action in the exercise of diplomatic
protection would the clean hands doctrine preclude? Would it render
inadmissible all diplomatic actions or only those related to the
presentation of a claim before an international tribunal? It is clear
from Article 1 of the ILC's Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection
that the ILC does not view diplomatic protection as including only
110. Id.
111. Id. at 46-48.
112. Id. at 46-51.
113. ILC Sixth Report, supra note 18, 12 (contending that the case does not
discuss or address the clean hands doctrine).
114. See PILLET & FAUCHILLE, supra note 75, at 46-51.
115. See ILC Sixth Report, supra note 18, 12 (contending that the
interpretation of Dominique Carreau, who stated that Ben Tillett did not have clean
hands and that the "arbitrator rejected Great Britain's claim because of Ben
Tillett's violation of Belgian law," is erroneous). It should be noted that even if
Dominique Carreau was right and Great Britain lost because of unclean hands, it
would only confirm that the clean hands doctrine is a defense at the merits stage
and not an element of admissibility.
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adjudicatory dispute settlement procedures.' 6 The ILC's adopted
definition of "diplomatic protection" also embraces all "lawful
procedures employed by States to inform each other of their views
and concerns, including protest, request for an enquiry and
negotiations aimed at the settlement of disputes."' 17 These lawful
procedures are called "diplomatic actions" in the Draft Articles on
Diplomatic Protection and are sometimes referred to as "informal
representations""' or "consular protection ' "9 in various sources.12°
The ILC's understanding of the term "diplomatic protection" as
covering both adjudicatory and non-adjudicatory measures is a
correct reflection of international practice.' 2' The division between
116. See Report of the International Law Commission: Fifty-Fourth Session,
U.N. GAOR, 57th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 171, U.N. Doc. A/57/10 (2002)
[hereinafter ILC 54th Session Report] (noting, however, that the use of force is not
a permissible method for the enforcement of the right of diplomatic protection).
117. Id. at 170.
118. See Colin Warbrick, Protection of Nationals Abroad, 37 INT'L & COMP.
L.Q. 1002, 1006-08 (1988) (setting forth general rules of the United Kingdom
regarding the taking up of international claims to a foreign state on behalf of a
national); see also R (Abbasi and another) v. Secretary of State for Foreign and
Commonwealth Affairs, 2002 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 414, 423 (noting that claimants
sought "merely informal diplomatic representation, rather than the presentation of
a formal claim"); Diplomatic Protection: United Kingdom Practice, 1999 BRIT.
Y.B. INT'L L. 526, 527 [hereinafter Diplomatic Protection: United Kingdom
Practice] (expressing that "[i]t may sometimes be permissible and appropriate to
make informal representations even where the strict application of the rules would
bar the presentation of a formal claim").
119. See Warbrick, supra note 118, at 1002 (explaining that a State's right to use
consular action to intervene with another State in order to protect an individual is
typically based on multilateral treaties or bilateral arrangements).
120. See discussion supra notes 118-19 (referencing sources discussing
"diplomatic actions").
121. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 713 cmt. b (2004) (mentioning communications with a national arrested
or charged with a crime and the provision of assistance as examples of actions
taken in exercise of diplomatic protection); see also Diplomatic Protection: United
Kingdom Practice, supra note 118, at 527 ("It may sometimes be permissible and
appropriate to make informal representations even where the strict application of
the rules would bar the presentation of a formal claim."); LUKE T. LEE, CONSULAR
LAW AND PRACTICE 124-88 (2d ed. 199 1) (providing an overview of United States'
practice of protection of nationals). See generally Jean-Pierre Puissochet, La
Pratique Francaise de la Protection Diplomatique, in LA PROTECTION
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formal and informal diplomatic representation appears fictitious,
since a diplomatic or consular representative making such a
representation always acts in his or her official capacity. However, it
is possible to draw a distinction within diplomatic protection
between bringing claims before a tribunal and other types of
actions. 122 The latter are referred to as "diplomatic actions" in the
Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection, while the former are called
"other means of peaceful settlement.' 1 23
If we understand the term "diplomatic protection" to include more
than a representation of the claim before an international tribunal,
application of the clean hands doctrine to diplomatic protection in
certain situations might run contrary to the Vienna Convention of
Consular Relations of 1963, particularly Article 36.124 The only way
DIPLOMATIQUE 115-20 (2003) (outlining French practice). It should be noted,
however, that some sources regard certain actions, such as assistance to detained
individuals in arranging for legal defense, as separate from diplomatic protection.
See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 1046 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed.,
1992) (explaining that a State practices diplomatic protection, as a rule, against
another State, but that the arrangement of legal defense for a detained national is
not necessarily directed against the other State); see also Wilheim Karl Geck,
Diplomatic Protection and the Extension of Individual Rights Through Treaties, in
31 L. & ST. 42, 45 (Institute for Scientific Co-operation ed., 1985) (contending that
diplomatic protection includes only protection against foreign States' actions
which are contrary to international law).
122. See ILC 54th Session Report, supra note 116, at 170 (observing that various
judicial decisions have distinguished between diplomatic protection in the form of
diplomatic action and in the form ofjudicial proceedings).
123. See id. at 170-71 (stating that "other means of peaceful settlement" include
negotiation, mediation, arbitration, and judicial proceedings).
124. See Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, art. 36, 21
U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 262, 293-94. Paragraph 1 of Article 36 of the Vienna
Convention of Consular Relations of 1963 states:
1. With a view to facilitating the exercise of consular functions relating to
nationals of the sending State:
(a) consular officers shall be free to communicate with nationals of the
sending State and to have access to them. Nationals of the sending State shall
have the same freedom with respect to communication with and access to
consular officers of the sending State;
(b) if he so requests, the competent authorities of the receiving State shall,
without delay, inform the consular post of the sending State if, within its
consular district, a national of that State is arrested or committed to prison or
to custody pending trial or is detained in any other manner. Any
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to incorporate the clean hands doctrine into the ILC's Draft Articles
on Diplomatic Protection would be by narrowing the definition of
diplomatic protection in the Draft Articles or by strictly defining the
scope of the clean hands doctrine to adjudicatory procedures (or, in
the language of the ILC's Draft Articles, "other means of peaceful
settlement").
Also, other questions are likely to arise when trying to incorporate
the clean hands doctrine into diplomatic protection. For example,
would the clean hands doctrine cover both intentional and
unintentional initial wrongful conduct of an alien? Perhaps, more
importantly, application of the clean hands doctrine to diplomatic
protection may contradict the general orientation of the Draft
Articles on Diplomatic Protection towards considering diplomatic
protection as a tool by which to advance human rights. 25 If we agree
that "until the individual acquires comprehensive procedural rights
under international law, it would be a setback for human rights to
abandon diplomatic protection,"1 26 the same can be said about
applying the clean hands doctrine to diplomatic protection. Such
application will obliterate the effectiveness of the very institution of
diplomatic protection.
For example, the clean hands doctrine may preclude a State from
exercising diplomatic protection in the form of assistance in cases of
communication addressed to the consular post by the person arrested, in
prison, custody or detention shall also be forwarded by the said authorities
without delay. The said authorities shall inform the person concerned without
delay of his rights under this sub-paragraph;
(c) consular officers shall have the right to visit a national of the sending State
who is in prison, custody or detention, to converse and correspond with him
and to arrange for his legal representation. They shall also have the right to
visit any national of the sending State who is in prison, custody or detention
in their district in pursuance of a judgment. Nevertheless, consular officers
shall refrain from taking action on behalf of a national who is in prison,
custody or detention if he expressly opposes such action.
Id.
125. See ILC First Report, supra note 8, 32 (declaring that "every effort
should be made to strengthen the rules that comprise the right of diplomatic
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arrest and detention of its nationals by authorities of a foreign State
when an individual has not been detained arbitrarily (i.e. has unclean
hands). 127 More often than not, an injury to a foreign national is
based upon his alleged violation of a State's domestic law. Even
subsequent procedural violations or treatment below a certain
minimum standard can be claimed to result from the initial wrongful
conduct that brought the individual to jail in the first place. 28 Such a
position may negate attempts to exercise diplomatic protection, since
"state practice shows that intervention of assistance is required
mainly in cases of arrest and detention of a national, [and] cases of
denial of justice in judicial proceedings."'' 29
Thus, the scope of the suggested application of the clean hands
doctrine to cases involving human rights violations is unclear.
Diplomatic protection is an institution of international law aimed at
benefiting individuals, and frequently concerns the protection of
human rights. 130 A number of authors have referred to the growing
importance of human rights and pointed out that "diplomatic
protection has to take account of the developments in international
human rights law."'' Consequently, some commentators have
suggested banishing the clean hands doctrine from cases involving
127. See BORCHARD, supra note 50, at 735 (contending that it is a general rule
that an injury to an alien arising out of a breach of local law affects complete or
partial forfeiture of diplomatic protection).
128. See Fitzmaurice, supra note 46, at 119 (interpreting principles of equity as
suggesting that a State guilty of illegal conduct may be deprived of juridical
grounds of complaint and opportunity to seek judicial redress for corresponding
illegalities on the part of another State, particularly where the illegalities were
committed to counter the initial wrongful conduct).
129. SEN, supra note 50, at 371 (explaining that it is a well recognized practice
of states to allow the opportunity for an arrested or detained alien to consult
diplomatic or consular representatives to evaluate whether he or she has been
treated in a proper manner with due regard to minimum standards).
130. See ILC First Report, supra note 8, 31 (suggesting that States will treat
other States' diplomatic protection claims more seriously than complaints to
human rights bodies).
131. Michael K. Addo, Interim Measures of Protection for Rights Under the
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 10 EUR. J. INT'L L. 713, 721 (1999)
(asserting that protection of individual rights cannot be based solely on traditional
principles of diplomatic protection).
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the protection of human rights. 3 2 Even though this position is not
commonly accepted, it is enjoying growing support.'33 Indeed,
applying the clean hands doctrine as a preliminary objection to
admissibility and as a defense at the merits stage in cases involving
diplomatic protection and the violation of human rights would only
aid the State violating an individual's rights and lead to impunity.
CONCLUSION
The analysis in this paper is based upon two tests. 3 4 The aim of
the first test is to establish whether or not the clean hands doctrine is
132. See, e.g., Fitzmaurice, supra note 46, at 120 (arguing that certain forms of
illegal action, including violations of human rights, can never be justified by prior
illegal action of another State, even when intended as a reply to such action); see
ILC Meeting 2793, supra note 2, at 16-17 (providing references to sources
supporting such position). Some sources erroneously cite the recent Van der Tang
case decided by the European Court of Human Rights as supporting the non-
applicability of the clean hands doctrine to cases involving human rights
violations. See Cohen-Jonathan & Flauss, supra note 80, at 688 (mentioning that
Van der Tang was the only case where the theory of clean hands was expressly
advanced as such). In this case, Van der Tang brought an action against Spain for
an alleged unreasonable length of pre-trial detention. Van der Tang v. Spain, 22
Eur. Ct. H.R. 363, T 46 (1993). A peculiar detail in this case was that Van der
Tang, after he was released on bail, failed to comply with the conditions imposed
on him. Id. 7 21, 27, 29. Van der Tang's violation of bail conditions formed the
basis of Spain's preliminary objections to Van der Tang's claim. Id. T 49. Spain
presented its preliminary objection as based on the clean hands doctrine, which is a
somewhat unusual interpretation of the doctrine, since Van der Tang's violation
occurred after allegedly wrongful conduct of Spain. Id. Spain's preliminary
objection was rejected not because the Court believed that the clean hands doctrine
was not applicable to human rights violations, but because the Court did not see
any connection between the wrongful conducts of Spain and Van der Tang. Id.
53. The issue of clean hands was not even addressed by the Court. Id. 49-53.
References to this case as supporting the inapplicability of the clean hands doctrine
to diplomatic protection are thus incorrect.
133. See discussion supra note 80 and accompanying text (describing criticism
of the use of the clean hands doctrine in international law).
134. See discussion supra Part I (describing the analysis of whether the clean
hands doctrine is applicable to diplomatic protection and whether it is necessary to
include it in the ILC Draft Articles).
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an established part of the law of diplomatic protection.'35 The second
test is employed to evaluate whether the doctrine of clean hands
should be included in the ILC's Draft Articles on Diplomatic
Protection. 3 6 Analysis in both cases shows that the doctrine of clean
hands is not an established part of diplomatic protection as a
condition for admissibility and, consequently, should not be
incorporated into the Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection. 137
The ILC is a body charged with the codification and progressive
development of international law.'38 Incorporation of the clean hands
doctrine into the Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection will
represent neither a codification of international law, since the
doctrine remains highly controversial and overwhelming support
exists against applying the doctrine to the field of diplomatic
protection, nor a progressive development of international law, since
it would weaken the protection of natural and legal persons from
violations of their rights.'39 It hardly seems true that "States might be
puzzled by the omission of any reference to the doctrine of clean
hands in the [ILC's] report,"'40 as Ian Brownlie claimed at the ILC.
Incorporating the clean hands doctrine into diplomatic protection
as a prerequisite for its exercise has no support in international
jurisprudence or state practice.' 4' Secondary authority supporting
such incorporation is unpersuasive and fails to provide adequate
135. See discussion supra Parts 11-III (applying a two-part test consisting of (1)
whether the clean hands doctrine applies to inter-State disputes and (2) whether the
clean hands doctrine is a question of admissibility or substantive law).
136. See discussion supra Parts IV-V (discussing support and criticism of
application of the clean hands doctrine to diplomatic protection).
137. See discussion supra Parts 11-V (explaining various problems that would
arise from application of the clean hands doctrine to diplomatic protection).
138. See Statute of the International Law Commission, G.A. Res. 174, U.N.
GAOR, 2d Sess., art. 1(1), U.N. Doc. A/519 (1947) (stating that the "International
Law Commission shall have for its object the promotion of the progressive
development of international law and its codification"), available at
http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/statufra.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2005).
139. See discussion supra Part IV (discussing conflicting opinions regarding the
application of the clean hands doctrine to diplomatic protection).
140. ILC Meeting 2819, supra note 2, at 11.
141. See discussion supra Part IV (analyzing the treatment of the clean hands
doctrine in various international cases).
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examples from the practice of international tribunals. 14 2 Many
authoritative primary and secondary sources make no mention of the
clean hands doctrine when speaking about prerequisites for the
exercise of diplomatic protection. 43 Those decisions of the ICJ most
commonly referred to by proponents of incorporating the clean hands
doctrine into diplomatic protection have nothing to do with
diplomatic protection or the clean hands doctrine itself."' Among the
most recent examples of cases decided by the ICJ in which the clean
hands doctrine could have been upheld by the Court as a preliminary
objection but was not are the Arrest Warrant, LaGrand and Avena
cases. 45 As the Court pointed out in the Avena case, "even if it were
shown, therefore, that Mexico's practice as regards the application of
Article 36 was not beyond reproach, this would not constitute a
ground of objection to the admissibility of Mexico's claim.' 46 In any
event, the issue of the lack of clean hands was not raised as a
preliminary objection to admissibility in the context of diplomatic
protection in any of these cases.'47
142. See discussion supra Part IV (explaining why cases under international
tribunals fail to support scholars' arguments in support of the clean hands doctrine
in diplomatic protection).
143. See, e.g., supra note 81; see also Warbrick, supra note 118, at 1006-08
(setting forth the United Kingdom's general rules which apply when a British
national appeals to the British government for diplomatic protection).
144. See discussion supra Part IV (referring, inter alia, to the Arrest Warrant,
Case Concerning Oil Platforms, and Gabcikovo-Nagymoros Project cases, which
all involved disputes involving direct inter-State disputes rather than diplomatic
protection of a national).
145. See discussion supra Part IV (noting that in all the cases mentioned, the
clean hands doctrine, when raised, was considered only as a question of merits).
146. Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004
I.C.J. 1, 47 (March 31).
147. In the LaGrand and Avena cases the United States raised arguments close
to that of clean hands, but in a context that was not related to the initial wrongful
conduct of an alien. Thus, these cases should not be viewed as supporting the
application of the clean hands doctrine to diplomatic protection. In its preliminary
objections the United States focused on Mexico's and Germany's own
implementation of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 24 April 1963.
LaGrand (F.R.G. v. U.S.), Counter-Memorial of the United States, 2000 I.C.J.
Pleadings, pt. V, ch. III (Mar. 27, 2000). This argument does not fit within the
framework of the application of the clean hands doctrine to diplomatic protection
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Parties only rarely invoke the clean hands doctrine as a
preliminary objection to the admissibility of a claim. 4 s Further, the
ICJ has never sustained such an objection-even beyond cases
dealing with diplomatic protection.'49 The clean hands doctrine,
whether a doctrine in its own right or just another name for the
principle of good faith, may be applied only at the merits stage, thus
giving adequate legal consideration to claimants' arguments and
possibly precluding claimants from obtaining relief due to an
absence of clean hands on their part. 5° Thus, as a doctrine dealing
with substantive law in international adjudication, the clean hands
doctrine is an established part of international law. However, such a
description does not apply to the doctrine of clean hands when
parties attempt to use it as a condition for the admissibility of
diplomatic protection.
As Sir Hersch Lauterpacht so eloquently expressed, "like law as a
whole, 'general principles of law' are, in substance, an expression of
what has been described as socially realizable morality."'' It hardly
seems a fair expression of a "socially realizable morality" to excuse
internationally wrongful conduct of States by wrongful conduct of
aliens, particularly when a State's wrongful conduct may violate jus
discussed in this paper and currently at issue in the ILC. Id. Perhaps it would be
better to identify the United States' arguments in the LaGrand and Avena cases as
simply based on the principle of "good faith." See ILC Sixth Report, supra note 18,
9 (discussing the arguments of the United States in the LaGrand and Avena cases
and their implications for the law of diplomatic protection).
148. See discussion supra Part IV (discussing Oil Platforms, where the ICJ
rejected the United States' preliminary objection based on clean hands because of
the doctrine's substantive nature).
149. See discussion supra Part IV (discussing various cases where preliminary
objections based on the clean hands doctrine were either rejected or never raised).
150. See discussion supra Part IV (analyzing whether the clean hands doctrine is
a question of admissibility or substantive law). There is growing support for
excluding application of the clean hands doctrine even at the stage of the
consideration of merits from cases involving violation of jus cogens norms and
human rights violations, a development which could only be welcomed. See, e.g.,
Fitzmaurice, supra note 46, at 120 (asserting that there are types of illegal action,
such as violations of human rights that can never be justified by or precluded from
legitimate complaint by the prior illegal action of another State).
151. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 33, at 172 (observing that courts are historically
responsible for infusing morals into law).
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cogens norms or obligatio ergo omnes. 52 It would be particularly
strange to excuse internationally wrongful conduct of States by
pointing to conduct which is less severe and is not considered
internationally wrongful. Consequently, the doctrine of clean hands
should not be included in the ILC's Draft Articles on Diplomatic
Protection as a condition for the admissibility of diplomatic
protection.'53
It was suggested that in the absence of the clean hands doctrine
"the exercise of diplomatic protection was paralyzed."' 54 Analysis
shows, contrary to this opinion, that application of the clean hands
doctrine will in fact jeopardize the institution of diplomatic
protection.' Individuals still have limited recourse by which to
address violations of international law committed by States.'
56
Consequently, suggestions that developments in the field of human
rights law have "rendered diplomatic protection obsolete"'57 do not
reflect the present state of international law, as John Dugard pointed
out in his First Report on Diplomatic Protection.' Thus, it is
152. See Sompong Sucharitkul, State Responsibility and International Liability
in Transnational Relations, in THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AT THE
THRESHOLD OF THE 21ST CENTURY 296 (1996) (referring to an obligation to
maintain the minimum standard of human rights and non-discriminatory treatment
of all aliens as an obligatio ergo omnes).
153. See ILC Sixth Report, supra note 18, 18 (remarking that a clean hands
doctrine provision would be unwarranted as an exercise in progressive
development because of the uncertainty about its existence and applicability to
diplomatic protection).
154. ILC Meeting 2793, supra note 2, at 4.
155. See ILC First Report, supra note 8, 29 (arguing that it would ultimately
be a setback for human rights to abandon or cripple diplomatic protection).
156. See id. T 31 (explaining that diplomatic protection offers a more effective
remedy than many other human rights laws because it is a customary rule of
international law with universal application).
157. Id. T 22 (examining the view of the first Special Rapporteur Garcia Amador
that the alien, as "a true subject" of international rights, should protect himself
when traveling abroad, save for extraordinary circumstances).
158. See id. 77 22, 24, 29 (explaining that although the individual may now have
more rights under international law, the remedies remain limited and thus, it would
be a setback for human rights to abandon diplomatic protection).
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important to ensure that this avenue remains as wide as possible for
individuals to gain access to justice. 5 9
159. See id. 29 (asserting that the use of diplomatic protection should be
strengthened and encouraged).
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